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I
INTRODUCTION

With the inevitable procrustean effects, this paper attempts to summarize familiar
and arcane writing on the presidency and its incumbents. I divide the literature into
six categories, each of which, I suggest, represents a relatively distinctive perspective
on the presidency. I portray these approaches by comparing and contrasting the
beliefs and assertions of representative writers along four dimensions: first, presidential responsibilities; second, the powers of the office; third, the importance of
the occupant's behavior; and fourth, prescriptions for institutional changes-which
often but not invariably stem from the first three dimensions. These beliefs and
assertions may be refurbished, revised, or modified in some way by the actions of
Presidents, and by the horde of words which scholars, politicians, journalists, and
other scribes compose and, with the encouragement and sometimes at the behest
of publishers, purvey. I therefore attempt not only to distinguish the six different
perspectives, but also to suggest why and how some of them have undergone
change.
This paper is not an attempt to canvass the entire range of literature about
the presidency or about particular Presidents. I concentrate on selected and representative works. Writings which treat particular facets of the office and its incumbent-subjects such as elections, advisory systems, presidential personality, and
so on-are excluded from my purview.2 Nor do I include epiphenomena from the
Saturday Review and New York Times Sunday Magazine. Moreover, by concentrating on the written word, I totally ignore television which, primarily because
of its pervasiveness and its personalization of the presidency, has a far more important impact on the mass public's knowledge and myths than any of the works
0 This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 41st Annual Meeting of the Southern Political
Science Association, Miami Beach, November 1969. I am indebted to my friend Thomas F. Cronin for
our illuminating conversations which helped me formulate some of the categories contained herein. I am
further indebted to Leonard Rubin and to my colleague Norman C. Thomas for penetrating comments
on the previous draft.
1-Assistant Professor of Political Science, Duke University.
I According to Norman Mailer in a review of The Group, i N.Y. REv. BOOKS 3 (1963): "lists and
categories are always the predictable refuge of the passionless, the mediocre, the timid, and the bowelbound who will not make another move until they have exhausted the last." He exaggerates.
Works in these areas are so well-known as to require no footnote. I would, however, draw the
reader's attention to three publications deserving particular attention. They are: Barber, The President
and His Friends, paper presented at the 65 th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969; E. PLASH, ECONoMIc ADvicE AND PREsmaNTA LEADRSIP: THE CouNCIL OF
ECONomrc AnvxsEas (1965); THE PRFSDsENIAL AvisosY SYsT M (T. Cronin & S. Greenberg, eds. 1969).
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I discuss.' My focus is on the authors whose books deal in a general way with the
presidency and its incumbents.
One final introductory comment is necessary. This paper is exploring uncharted
territory. The classificatory scheme, therefore, is intended to be both suggestive
and tenative rather than logically and analytically distinct.
II
Ti

PERSPECTIVE

A. Roles
The most prevalent and academically respectable way of viewing the presidency
is in terms of the President's roles. Indeed, it may be dubbed the received view of
the office. Presidential roles are arrayed, and range from those provided for in the
Constitution (Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief), to those which assertedly now
devolve upon the office. The latter include Chief Legislator and World Leader.
Clinton Rossiter's widely used text4 is a typical example of this genre and has the
roles all specified-from Chief Executive to World Leader-in the first chapter.'
Obviously each role is a presidential responsibility. But the authors of this
view also often contend that no other American governmental institution can adequately compensate for presidential dereliction. And, without necessarily adducing
specific evidence, they emphasize that the public expects an incumbent President to
perform his roles. Thus, an almost inevitable concomitant of a role perspective is
the contention that the President is possessed of "far more responsibility than he
has power."6 Nonetheless, the occupant of the office does make an enormous difference; for the presidency is malleable and some Presidents are far more able than
others. Rossiter, for example, compares Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman,
and Dwight D. Eisenhower in terms of their ability to meet their abundant responsibilities. Perhaps inevitably, Rossiter depicts Roosevelt's conception and conduct
of the presidency most favorably, while Eisenhower receives fewest plaudits 7
Thomas A. Bailey exemplifies the zenith (some might say the nadir) of the
"roles" approach in his book on presidential greatness. 8 The forty-three roles he
provides9 are not only measuring criteria of presidential greatness as he conceives it,
but also a compendium of presidential responsibility (also as he conceives it). The
President is proclaimed Administrator-in-Chief, Bureaucrat-in-Chief, Legislator-in'For an example of a discussion of public images of the presidency, see Sigel, Image of the American
Presidency--PartII of an Exploration into Popular Views of Presidential Power, 1o MIwESrT J. PoL. ScI.
123"41 (1966).
'C. RossiaR, THnE AMauCAN PRESIDENCY (rev. ed. i96o).

'Id. at 5-43.
' F. HELLER,

Ti PRESIDENCY: A MODERN PaRSPacnvE 87 (1960).
'Rossra--,
supra note 4, at 142-81.
'T. BAILEY, PREsmENIAL GREATNESS (r966).

'Id. at 262-66.
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Chief, Chief of State, Spokesman-in-Chief, Financier-in-Chief, Diplomat-in-Chief,
Appropriator-in-Chief, General-in-Chief ("of so-called free-nations,"),' ° and so on.
By adding other criteria such as a President's skill at handling his press conferences,
his ability to bypass the Senate with executive agreements, the quality of his leadership, and his management of public opinion, Bailey makes it clear that he views the
powers of the office as elastic. By evaluating Presidents against his criteria (although
with becoming modesty he does admit to the difficulty of the task), Bailey demonstrates his belief in the importance of the occupant of the office and his conviction
that a President who extends his powers for the benefit of the nation merits the
appellation "great."
Interestingly, Bailey alludes to the war in Vietnam. "Great Presidents generally
have had big wars, and with the escalation of bombing and shooting in South
Vietnam, Johnson may enjoy this added advantage as he eagerly seeks an honored
place beside Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt."' 1 Although it is problematic
whether he would revise it as one of his criteria, I doubt that Bailey would be so
sanguine now about the relationship between this war and presidential greatness.
Given his inclination to endorse activist Presidents, we might expect Bailey to
prescribe structural changes in the Presidency and also propose additional powers
for the office. That he does not do so is probably a result of the consciously evaluative
rather than prescriptive purpose of his book. Other authors of the "roles" approach
are not so reticent. And, on the grounds that a President's responsibilities are so
overwhelming, while the powers of the office are inadequate to meet them, these
writers often suggest ways of increasing the presidency's formal powers. Such proposals include according the President greater autonomy in making appointments,
further curtailing the ability of Congress to impede executive reorganization, and
endowing the President with an item veto. '
These proposals to enlarge the power of the presidency are rarely accompanied
by any disquiet among proponents of the "roles" approach. Their emphasis is on
the difficulty a President encounters in handling his job and fulfilling the manifold
expectations pressed upon him. As Tugwell puts it:
[i]f the President cannot, by using the cleverist administrative devices and by
devoting to his duties the utmost industry, stretch his personal directions over
the enormous machine he commands; and if he often cannot find the time, to
say nothing of the capability, to make all the vital decisions he is supposed to make
-then we do have to ask ourselves in what other way the institution can be enlarged to meet the looming responsibilities of an even more demanding future.' 3
The possible solution for Tugwell is some form of plural executive. But what
is important is the formulation of the problem, not the solution. There is no
Id. at 266.
I0
-Id. at 334. This was probably written in 1965.
12 F. HELLm, supra note 6, at 88-89.

" R. TuowELL,

THE ENLARIGEMENT OF THE PREMENCy 492

(ig6o).
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concern about the possibility (however remote) of tyranny in any form; nor is there
much discussion about possible repercussions resulting from the aggrandizement
of the presidency. It may be, for example, that more powers not only beget more
responsibilities but that they make a President more vulnerable by imposing upon
him requirements for the kinds of explicit and detailed involvements in the political
process which he may need to avoid. Thus, an item veto might demonstrate for
the public the political dimension of the presidency and exacerbate conflict with
Congress. A dissatisfied Congress (especially if controlled by the party without the
presidency) could reduce authorized expenditures, conduct even nastier and more
frequent inquiries into Administration department management and policies than
it does at present, and even withhold some appropriations altogether. And more
explicit and clear power for the President is likely to make the party holding the
office more accountable to the electorate, which is not necessarily desirable either
for the President, or his party, or those who see blurred distinctions between America's political parties as essentially beneficial for social cohesion. Despite this, for
most of those authors who emphasize presidential roles, the question is how the
office can be strengthened to enable its occupant better to run the country. It is
assumed that additional responsibilities and increases of power will work in both
the President's and the public's interest.
B. Obligations
As discussed under the "roles" category, much of the literature identifies the
President as the repository of his country's hopes and characterizes him as Chief
Executive, Chief Legislator, Voice of the People, Protector of Peace, etc. Implicit in
this characterization is the expectation that he will carry out these responsibilities.
There is, however, a more extreme version of this perspective which merits its own
category. This is the writing which identifies an area, defines it as falling clearly
within presidential responsibility, proceeds to complain about presidential dereliction, and exhorts the present and future occupants of the office to action. Such work
is replete with illustrations of the reasons for action and includes constitutional
justification. Often the presidency is chosen as the necessary source of action because
the other institutions of government at the national, state, and local levels are
assertedly unwilling or incapable of adequate response.
In The Presidency and Individual Liberties,14 Richard P. Longaker, although he
denies any intention "to suggest that the burden on the President to protect constitutional rights is ultimately any greater than it is for the other institutions of
American government or for the least of us,"'" belies his disavowal by the following
kind of statement:
"R.
'

LONGAKER, THE PRESIDENCY AND INDIVMUAL LIBE1RzaES (I96I).
Id. at vii-ix.
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Wise and persistent use of the instruments of the presidency-the appointing
power, the selective and vigorous use of law enforcement, and the cumulative
advances by means of the imaginative application of administrative discretion, to
name only a few---can nourish freedom even in the face of Cold War pressures.
Executive neglect, on the other hand, may lead to the undermining of the very substance of American constitutionalism. What must be recognized today is that sustained leadership in the field must originate in White House direction, coordination,
and sensitivity ....Because the major problems will find their way to the White
House, to be dealt with or neglected, here in particular there should be individuals
who speak of liberty rather than security and who feel committed to a positive role
for the Federal executive in civil rights. 16
The responsibility is depicted as pressing, and its neglect is supposedly dangerous
to the health of the body politic.
The "obligations" and "roles" perspectives both place considerable importance
on the actions of the President. Indeed, Presidents can be differentiated on the
basis of their responses to their responsibilities. Yet, whereas the "roles" approach
often explicitly and invariably implicitly stresses the necessity of increasing presidential powers, this is not to the same extent a theme of the "obligations" writers.
Thus, Longaker makes clear that so far as protecting constitutional rights is
concerned, the President possessed adequate powers-he merely needed to use
them. Both perspectives, however, generally share an absence of the fear that presidential activity can be anything other than beneficial and humane.
Probably the most flamboyant example of the "obligations" category, and it is
consciously hortatory, appeared in 1966. In it Bertram Gross argues that "the new
role of the White House is to provide a center of creative stability in the midst of
turbulent change."'" The President is charged with some of his conventional
responsibilities, such as Peacemaker and Champion of Justice, but to these Gross
adds Truth Teller, Humanist, and Learner. This article was probably written
during the period of the Johnson administration's greatest legislative success when,
for a few euphoric months, Congress no longer seemed an obstacle to presidential
legislative leadership. And Gross certainly sees the presidency and its occupant as
pivotal in the American political system. Yet responsibilities like Truth Teller and
Learner may well represent reactions by Gross to President Johnson's conduct of his
office. There is an awareness of presidential fallibility here relatively absent from
other works.
Yet the "obligations" writers are politically disingenuous in the sense that they
rarely encourage the President to follow their prescriptions by adumbrating the
gains in power, prestige, and popularity that might accrue. Conversely, they neglect
to discuss the negative repercussions that might result if he undertakes the proposed
activity. Their books, then, remain academic in their effects on the President. The
oId.at 232.
17 Gross, Some Questions for Presidents, in A GRAT SoCMErY 305-50 (B. Gross ed.
is at 309.

1966). The quote
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effect of these books on the public, however, is probably to convey an impression of
presidential dereliction while simultaneously raising expectations about the ability
of Presidents to act and the beneficial results to be expected from such action were
it to be undertaken.
It has been observed that generals develop strategy to win the last war rather
than the next. Similarly, writers on the presidency address themselves to the model
and experiences provided by the President in power or the one who has recently
left office. The "roles" and "obligations" perspectives became particularly prevalent
during the late fifties and early sixties. They may well have been a response to
the problems that seemed to accumulate in the United States during the complacency
and apparent stagnation of the Eisenhower presidency. Those wishing to see an
attempt made to solve these problems identified the presidency as the most, if not
the only, appropriate institution. Since Eisenhower had essentially a passive conception of his office, he became something of a symbol and focal point for dissatisfaction-especially among liberal academics. Rossiter's book, for example, seems
to reflect this irritation with Eisenhower.
Clearly Eisenhower did not fully accept many of the responsibilities thrust upon
him by either the "roles" or the "obligations" schools. And although it is often a
tenet of the "roles" approach that the presidency needs additional power, Eisenhower
was criticized by both "roles" and "obligations" authors for not using the power he
did possess. Accordingly, with their emphasis on the importance of the occupant, both
views placed great expectations on the next incumbent. Indeed, Longaker's book,
published in i961, appears to be a clear rebuke to Eisenhower and an appeal to his
successor.
The next President was John F. Kennedy and his experience graphically demonstrated the gap between presidential responsibility, as conceived by scholars in the
first two categories, and the President's powers. Koenig put the restraints-andconstraints point of view colorfully when he described the source of President
Kennedy's discouragement as the "far-stretching chasm between the ideal of a
vigorous, creative Presidency he envisaged in his gallant 196o campaign and the
reality of the complicated, restraint-bound, frustrating office he discovered after his
inauguration.""8 And Sidney Warren in 1964 similarly sounded the motif of ever
greater obligations on the President combined with the limitations and constraints on
the Chief Executive's course of action:
The nation has come to look to the White House for an immediate answer to

any and all significant problems. Yet, ironically, in a period when the presidency
is at the very peak of its influence, probably nowhere in the world is executive

leadership more hemmed in, more limited by political considerations, more
vulnerable to pressures from within and without than in the United States.10
8

L.

KoENIG,

THE CmEs ExFcurivF 3 (1964). When Koenig published a revised version of his

book in 1968 his views were essentially unchanged.
- S. WARREN, THE PRESIDENT AS WoRLD LEADER
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Hence, the views of the presidency held by the scholars who dominated the first
two categories began to change as the experiences of the Kennedy administration
provided fresh empirical data. The limitations and frustrations of the office began
to be accentuated. These difficulties were most immediate to the men in the Kennedy
administration and their perspectives provide our next category.
C. Constraints
For the men who serve in an administration and subsequently strive to depict
their experiences, the story is a combination of achievement and frustration. The
Kennedy presidency exemplifies this category because it generated such an outburst
of prose from the assassinated Chief Executive's cohorts (many of whom justified
their efforts by claiming they were merely inadequately trying to write the book he
would have written had he lived).
John F. Kennedy was an activist President whose rhetoric proclaimed vast
responsibilities for his office. There is, therefore, inevitably an inclination for those
who served in his administration to blame his frustrations, disappointments, and
failures on the constraints surrounding the presidency and the President's lack of
power to overcome them. Such a tendency was reinforced when the President was
killed before he really had a sufficient opportunity fully to pursue his policies, let
alone implement them. Conversely, the late President's accomplishments are lauded
and cited as examples of his ability to overcome his office's lack of power. This is
the tenor of the "histories" emanating from participants in the Kennedy administration. The President had enormous responsibilities (getting America moving
again, for example); his powers were inadequate to the task; but by dint of his
ability, skill, effort, and concern, he was able to make a start. Implicit in this
approach is a general prescription that the presidency be strengthened. But more
important, is the explicit assumption that an activist conception of the presidency is
appropriate and necessary and that men like John F. Kennedy are the kind to occupy
the office. It is not surprising that many members of the Kennedy administration
joined Robert F. Kennedy's 1968 campaign.
Nonetheless, men who have actually participated in the conduct of government
at the presidential level tend to emphasize the burdens and difficulties of the office.
They suggest (although not necessarily expressly) that a President, even when he
wants to face and deal with his manifold responsibilities (as the writers conceive
and identify them), is constrained in at least four ways. First, the problems are
often intractable or difficult to solve. Second, the President is limited in his options
and constrained in his choices of which problems to tackle, let alone try to resolve.
Third, the decision-making process is a complex and inordinately difficult one,
particularly if the decision-maker takes into account the manifold sources of information and views and the sensibilities (personal and political) on which his
decisions impinge. Two and three are obviously interrelated. Finally, even when a
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decision is reached, the obstacles to its implementation and then execution are so
extensive as often to render it nugatory.
The views I have outlined can be found, in between the paeans, in the books
by Schlesinger,20 Sorensen, 2 ' and Hilsman2 - as they chronicle the experiences of
the Kennedy administration.
A distinction should be made, however, between domestic and foreign policy.
Here, the participants' books confirm the impression conveyed by some scholars that
a President is somewhat more confined in his domestic policy where he must often
deal with the mastodons of Congress.
Yet even Hilsman, who specifically concentrates on foreign policy-making even
more than Schlesinger, and who asserts that President Kennedy was successful in
surmounting many of the administrative, political, and legislative obstacles to
decision-making and implementation, quotes President Truman's famous comment
which the latter made as he contemplated turning over the presidency to Eisenhower: "He'll sit here and he'll say, 'Do thisl Do thatl' And nothing will happen.
Poor Ike--it won't be a bit like the Army."' And, at the end of his book, Hilsman
elaborates:
In the field of foreign affairs, the President's power is immense. His is the
monopoly in dealing with other states. But he, too, must build a consensus for his
policy if it is to succeed. He must bring along enough of the different factions
in Congress to forestall revolt, and he must contend for the support of wider constituencies, the press, interest groups, and "attentive publics." Even within the
Executive Branch itself, his policy will not succeed merely at his command, and
he must build cooperation and support, obtain approval from some, acquiescence
from others, and enthusiasm from enough to carry it to completion.2 4
So, although a President is sometimes less frustrated and confined in his conduct of
foreign policy than in domestic affairs, he is still constrained. This is the essential
view conveyed by the participant-observers.
Most of the participants cited do not propose to place more responsibilities on
the President, perhaps because they construe such responsibilities primarily as
burdens. And although they may believe that the presidency needs stregthening,
this does not necessarily lead them into specific proposals for increasing the powers
of the office. One reason may be that most of the writers in this category began
their Washington sojourns when the White House was occupied by John F.
Kennedy and ended them during the tenure of Lyndon B. Johnson. Under the onslaught of Johnson's aggressive conduct of the office, not to mention the expanded
war in Vietnam, they are conscious that presidential activity may not always be
beneficial.
"oA. SCHLEsiNGER, JR., A THrouSAND DAYS (,965).
T. SoRENsEN, KENNEDY (x965).

2

23

R. HILsmAN, To Move A NAToN (1967).
7d. at 6.

"4 Id. at 561-62. Presidents may have objectives, I'm not sure they have policies.
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The one apparent exception is McGeorge Bundy who, in his Godkin lectures
delivered at Harvard in March 1968, argued forcefully that American government,
including the presidency, must be strengthened.
His position is clear, even
' in such areas as race,
simple. There is what he characterizes as "explosive need,"26
poverty, communication, and nuclear energy. These needs are the responsibility
of government. But government's capacity to respond is limited by "alarming
weakness." ' The solution is to strengthen government, which means strengthening
the presidency, first to meet "present responsibilities," and second, to meet the "new
28
ones that are coming."
Yet, returning to Cambridge from his Washington duties, Bundy encountered
pervasive distaste for the war in Vietnam. Hence he is constrained to admit that
"rhetorically, at least, there is difficulty in presenting an argument for greater
strength in our government in a year when many of our most concerned and
conscientious citizens are inclined to believe that it is precisely the strength of a
government they disagree with that has brought us to great trouble in Vietnam."'
Subsequently, he scarcely treats Vietnam and his argument is independent of it.
Nonetheless, he does ask those "who have strong feelings about Vietnam to consider
how much they would give to a President they approved." ' ° This seems to beg
the issue. It may be that Lyndon Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam war manifested
a lack of presidential power rather than the reverse; this is too complex an issue to
argue here. The point is that to some observers the war reveals two things: first,
that Presidents can make mistakes; and secondly, that the effects of such errors can
be devastating. Accordingly, there has been a diminution in the enthusiasm for
loading responsibilities onto the President and in the proposals for increasing his
power.
In any event, Bundy's suggestions for change are of an order different from those
made by writers who adopt the "roles" perspective. It is true that he proposes to
increase the President's power by empowering him to change basic tax rates within
certain limits. But among his more significant suggestions is one designed to increase
the prestige and authority of Cabinet-level executives. The job of these men, as
Bundy explains it somewhat unclearly, would be to help the President and be more
responsive to him than the present Cabinet officers. At the same time, however, they
would tend to diminish "excessive personalism," 31 if the President had such a
tendency.
Here, Bundy is in a muted way responding to the presidency of Lyndon B.
Johnson because his proposal, if adopted, would probably have the effect of in" M. ButNDY, Tim STRENGTH oF GovERmNMNT (i968).

20 Id.at i. It is the title of the first chapter.
27
id.at 27. It is the title of the second chapter.

28

29
8

Id. at 29.
Id. at x.

o d.

"x d. at 55-
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creasing the power of the presidency but not necessarily the power of the President.
In the same refrain, Bundy has a sober paragraph on presidential fallibility3 2
One conclusion possibly to be derived from Bundy's discreet comments and proposals is that, despite the ambiguities of meaning inherent in America's sorry rdations with Vietnam, the episode generally serves as a warning, chastening experience; and that we are unlikely to see an abundance of works in the near future
proposing to increase the President's power-at least with respect to foreign relations.
In fact, we may expect the reverse.
Perhaps representing the start of a trend, towards the end of 1966 Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. engaged in a partial debate with Alfred de Grazia (a propounder
of the "anti-aggrandizement" approach to be discussed as category five) under the
auspices of the American Enterprise Institute.p He advocated giving Congress "a
more authoritative and continuing voice in fundamental decisions in foreign policy, 8' 4
and argued that the citizen's obligation is to support Congress or the presidency
depending on the results desired. This view, Schlesinger hastened to add, was
not "simply a consequence of the Vietnam war.' 3't Still, the Johnson presidency
then in full swing, and the Vietnam war increasingly conspicuous and bothersome,
do appear to have raised questions about presidential power and its employment
which Schlesinger had previously slighted.
Yet, despite Bundy's proposals for strengthening the presidency and Schlesinger's
caveats about presidential power, this category is one of the least susceptible to
change. The view from the White House and the Executive Office is one of good
intentions and difficult decisions impeded by bureaucratic inertia, incompatible
demands, and rampageous pluralism. Experience in governing leads to the realization that additional power to the President may not resolve problems but increase
them; that administrative re-organizations have been tried in the past without
noticeable success; and that clear-cut triumphs for a President are few and often
overshadowed by frustrations and mistakes. The constraints gradually take on a
rather immutable cast.
D. Statecraft
Looming over the three previous categories, and apparently required reading
for members of the Kennedy administration both during and after their sojourns in
Washington, is Richard Neustadt's PresidentialPower?, Hilsman's book in particular reflects the Neustadt approach to and conception of leadership.
- 1d. at 57ScmHI..sNGat, JR., & A. DE GRAZiA, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY (1967). It was a partial
"A.
iebate because the two participants never appear to have confronted and argued with each other orally.
84
Id. at 28.
851d. at 101.
PRESIETrIrAx. Powzn (1968). For an intelligent explication of some of the merits
"OR. NusrrA,
and defects in the book see Sperlich, Bargainingand Overload, in THE PRESIDENCY (A. Wildavsky ed. x969).
For a work which considers leadership in a comparative and less instrumental fashion, see PoLmeAx
LEADMssMP IN INDUsTMALIZED SociMsFs (L. Edinger ed. z967), and the bibliography therein.
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Neustadt, of course, is in the tradition of Machiavelli, a tradition which for its
apparent hard-headed devotion to the realities of power has only appeared in American politics in the form of such blatantly cynical and droll books as Riordon's
Plunkitt of Tammany Hall and the acidulous comments of Mr. Dooley.
Neustadt's positions on my four criteria can be briefly summarized. The President
has overwhelming responsibilities; his powers are conspicuously limited; the views
and actions of the occupant are vital; and such Presidents as Franklin D. Roosevelt
with an activist conception of the office are infinitely preferable to passive occupants
like Dwight D. Eisenhower. Neustadt is not, however, particularly interested in
prescribing structural change. Rather, his book is a manual (although not always
a clear one) advising the President how best to employ those powers he already
possesses.
Since Neustadt is the primary contemporary American exponent of the "statecraft" category, we must look to him for changes in this perspective. The main
source is the afterword on JFK contained in the latest paperback edition of Presidential Power. Neustadt's closing paragraphs in this new section are instructive:
The President remains our system's Great Initiator. When what we once
called "war" impends, he now becomes our system's Final Arbiter. He is no less
a clerk in one capacity than in the other. But in the second instance those he
serves are utterly dependent on his judgement-and judgement then becomes the
mark of "leadership." Command may have a narrow reach but it encompasses
irreparable consequences. Yet persuasion is required to exercise command, to get
one's hands upon subordinate decisions. With this so-nearly absolute dependence
upon presidential judgment backed by presidential skill, we and our system have
no previous experience. Now in the i96o's we begin to explore it.
Hopefully, both citizens and Presidents will do so without fear, or histrionics,
or withdrawals from reality, or lurches toward aggression. Regardless of the
dangers, presidential power, even in this new dimension, still has to be sought and
used; it cannot be escaped. We now are even more dependent
than before on
37
the mind and temperament of the man in the White House.

The approach remains the same. The objective-to guide the President in gaining,
preserving, and employing his power is unchanged. Yet the lines quoted above are
suffused with awareness of the dangers that inhere in the presidency and the damage
which may result from presidential errors or abuses of power. It may be that
Neustadt is unhappy over the conduct of the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson.
More likely, he is concerned over what that conduct revealed about the damage
which could result from a misapplication of presidential powers (or a President's
ability to extend them through such dubious instrumentalities as the Tonkin Gulf
resolution). In any event this "afterword: JFK" contains a note of caution and
concern generally absent from the remainder of the book.
'

NEuSTADT,

supra note 36, at 213-14.
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E. Anti-aggrandizement
"Anti-aggrandizement" is a perennial thread in the literature on the presidency.
Constitutionalists who put their faith in the balance and separation of powers look
with dismay at the increased powers and importance of the presidency. They might
agree that the United States faces many difficult problems, but they scarcely consider
this sufficient reason sanguinely to increase the number and nature of presidential
roles, or to enhance presidential power-particularly at the expense of Congress.
Consequently, in his magisterial The President: Office and Powers,"8 Edward S.
Corwin describes "a long-term trend at work in the world that consolidates power
in the executive departments of all governments.""0 The result is an institutionalized
presidency which may jeopardize ° private and personal rights. Individual Presidents may differ, and their impacts on the office vary considerably, yet the impetus
to institutionalization of the office is apparently irresistible unless specific changes
are implemented in order to control presidential power. Accordingly, Corwin proposes that the President's Cabinet be constructed from a joint Legislative Council
containing the leading members of Congress 1
Just as some of the men included in the "obligations" category were responding
to the somewhat lacadaisical conduct of the office by President Eisenhower, Corwin's
book may have been influenced by a distaste for the increase in presidential power
occurring under Franklin D. Roosevelt. Similarly, shortly after Roosevelt's death,
C. Perry Patterson's book on the presidency appeared in which he advocated cabinet
government. His purpose, however, was not to strengthen the presidency but to
"responsible cabinet government is the best possible
weaken it. As Patterson put it,
means in the absence of constitutional restraint to prevent the permanent establishment of irresponsible executive government in this country in the hands of one
'
man" 42
In recent years the "anti-aggrandizement" approach has been a reaction to and
a direct rejection of the "obligations" and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the "roles"
views. "Anti-aggrandizement" is now propounded most eloquently by Alfred de
Grazia. De Grazia spells out his views in Republic in Crisis where he attacks the
conventional views of the presidency with radical scepticism 43 He is not convinced -that we are now more inundated by crises than ever and 'he observes that
the cry of emergency (which may be created by the President) results in an increase
in the already too great presidential power. "Congressmen, being only human, are
themselves subject to the man-on-horseback hallucinations. The releasing of power
8

E. CORWIN, THE PREsMENT: OFFIcE AND PowEms (957). This book first appeared in x940. Werc
it not for Corwin's pronounced "anti-aggrandizement" view, his book could be included under the
"roles" category.
" Id.at 304.
4
oAlthough Corwin refrains from using so strong a word, his concern is evident.
"Ild. at 297.
42 C. PATnrEE

, PREssmNTAL GovR smrNr IN Tns UNIrED STATEs, at vi (1947).
""A. DE GRPArA, REPUBLIC IN CRIsis 69-144 (1965).
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in generous and vague terms to President Johnson in 1965 to deal as he saw fit
'
with the Vietnam conflict was typical."44
Even if this is an age of crisis (which de Grazia is not really willing to admit),
it is, in his opinion, a mistake to turn to the presidency and its occupant for solutions.
For the President is part of an executive force. Americans do not realize this because
of their penchant (reinforced by the media and historians) to personalize this
executive force in the President. By the executive force, de Grazia is apparently
referring to the bureaucracy or more precisely the civil service. The presidency is
merely its spearhead. This means that although there are differences in the attitudes,
temperaments, and inclinations of Presidents, the policies they support are similar:
Because of how he is chosen and because of his role in the system, the President
will emphasize certain policies and propound certain ideas. It appears, for example, that it is very difficult for a federalist, "voluntarist" decentralizing, "isolationist" politician to be elected President, or if elected President to espouse such
policies.4 5
De Grazia's prescriptions for change are quite explicit. "The President should
be seen as a person furnished with a license to capture as much as he can, and
46
as Congress will let him, of the flora and fauna of a gigantic reservation." Such
imperialism must be resisted. The solution is to strengthen Congress against the
executive forceY' This should be done not only because in terms of coordination,
integration, and efficiency, Congress is a more responsible institution, but because
the executive force is already too powerful. Conversely, all the proposals for increasing the power of the President, such as an item veto and unfettered authority
to reform agencies, should be strenuously opposed. Otherwise we may experience
rule by the bureaucratic state with the President supplying the face just "as the
4
frozen pond needs a skater to make a winter scene perfectly human."
It may not be entirely accurate to attribute to the presidency the qualities of an
increased bureaucracy in the overall administration; for the presidency is in many
of its essentials separate and different from the administrative branch. Nor is it
entirely clear how presidential irresponsibility necessarily follows from possessing
many powers or even from their misuse. I suspect that presidential irresponsibility
is more likely to be a function of the relationship between the office and the "legitimate" demands placed upon it, with "legitimate" being, as often as not, redefined
from one problem to another. Nonetheless, given the Johnson presidency and
America's external entanglements, we can probably anticipate a spate of books in
the "anti-aggrandizement" category.
"Id. at 95.
'1d. at 79.
"Id.
"'For his specific proposals, see id. at 215-43, 298.
" Id. at 105.
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F. Power Elite
C. W. Mills provides a deliberate attempt to refute those he calls "the image
makers." "The images they now offer us are not those of an elite in irresponsible command of unprecedented means of power and manipulation, but of a scatter of reasonable men overwhelmed by events and doing their best in a difficult situation." ' This
view, which smacks of the embattled and constrained President discussed under
category C, is replaced in Mills' analysis by a "power elite," and the presidency is
only one among a nexus of institutions controlled by this elite.
Since the power elite approach is ostensibly concerned with the presidency only
as a small component of a much broader phenomenon, it might seem inappropriate
to treat it as a distinctive category. I do so because I regard it as an important
emerging perspective on the presidency which can be usefully compared and contrasted with the five perspectives previously outlined.
According to Mills, it is the power elite who are
in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of society. They rule the
big corporations. They run the machinery of state and claim its prerogatives.
They direct the military establishment.50
Obviously, then, there is not much point discussing the distribution of responsibilities
and powers because, on issues of pith and moment, it is the power elite which
decides. One would assume, further, that this view downgrades the importance of
the President's behavior. Yet, when Mills adduces evidence to confirm his analysis
he refers to pivotal moments in which small circles (meaning the power elite)
"do decide or fail to decide."51 Mills cites as such moments "the dropping of the
A-bombs over Japan ... the decision on Korea ... the confusion about Quemoy and
Matsu, as well as before Dienbienphu . . . the sequence of maneuvers which
involved the United States in World War II.""s2 These instances refer to decisions

ultimately made by three different Presidents. All are foreign policy decisions.
Consequently, implicit in Mills' analysis is the idea that in the membership of the
power elite the President is primus inter pares in his decision-making ability, although
in making his decisions the President acts in consonance with other members of the
elite and follows what Mills refers to in a different context as its "community of
interests."O
Mills' portrayal of the power elite is directed by a populist anger and moral
fervor. This leads him, therefore, into a discussion of the "higher immorality,"
as if the combined weight of his expose and indignation will lead to beneficial results.
Otherwise, he seems pessimistic about the prospects for change. "At the top there
has emerged an elite of power. The middle levels are a drifting set of stalemated,
"' C. Mi'Ls, THE POwR ELITE 325 (1956).
501d. at 4.
" Id. at 22.
52

Id.
" ld. at 283.
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balancing forces ....The bottom of this society is politically fragmented, and even
as a passive fact, increasingly powerless."54 Of course, proposals for structural
changes in the presidency are not important in Mills' analysis.
In 1967 G. William Domhoff wrote a book inan attempt, among other things,
empirically to demonstrate or at least to bolster Mills' thesis.P As Domhoff put it:
"We will not assume, as Mills did, that the Executive branch of the federal government is part of a power elite, but will instead show that its leaders are either members of the upper classes or former employees of institutions controlled by members
of the upper class.:" 6 Domhoff then tries to document that the power elite controls
the executive branch through prior control of the presidential nominations which,
7
in turn, it controls through the financing of political campaigns.1
Like Mills, Domhoff too has received considerable criticism of his thesis and
methodology. I cite him merely to indicate the persistence of the power elite theme.
Whereas Domhoff tends to repeat Mills' theme, Noam Chomsky develops it.
For Chomsky, s although he may never use Mills' term, America is ruled by a
power elite and this elite, as demonstrated by the Vietnam war, can be both evil
and dangerous in its effects on America and other countries which bear the brunt
of its policies. And, more explicitly than Mills, Chomsky denigrates the importance
of the presidency. "There is a growing realization that it is an illusion to believe
that all will be well if only today's liberal hero can be placed in the White House. '59
Chomsky differs from Mills in tone and prescription. Mills is sarcastic and
biting; Chomsky is angry and bitter. Ironically, while Mills appeared pessimistic
about prospects for change, Chomsky sees in the course of the Vietnam war an
opportunity, for it has provoked opposition not only to those in political power
who were involved in its conception, execution, and defense, it has also engendered
questioning and threatens to undercut the legitimacy of those who occupy positions
of importance in the American political system and many of the institutions themselves-including the presidency. Finally, whereas Mills did not appear to proffer
a solution, Chomsky advocates draft resistance, and endorses the "revival of anarchist
thinking [which] ...offers some real hope that the present American crisis will

not become an American and world catastrophe. '

0

III
CONCLUSIONS

I have briefly canvassed the component parts of six perspectives on the presidency, tried to explain their sources, and suggested a few of the reasons why they
'Id. at 324.
G. DomoFF,Wio RurLs AmECA? (1967).
G
SId. at 9.
Ild. at 85. See generally id. at 84-105.
=SN. CHomsy, AmERICAN POWER AND THE NEW MANDARINS
9

I1d. at 18.
ooId. at ig.

(1967).
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might have been modified in recent years. Certainly my list is not complete. Furthermore, given the varieties of conduct available to Presidents; the different viewpoints and concerns of authors; and the fact that the presidency is, if not protean,
at least an office both of extraordinary power and extraordinary limitations, we can
expect diverse perspectives to persist.
As for the six perspectives discussed in this paper, I would speculate that they
may correspond to particular segments of the political spectrum.0 1 To oversimplify
grossly, conservatives would be inclined to be "and-aggrandizement"; moderates
would tend to have a "constraints" perspective;' liberals would be partial to the
"roles" approach; more extreme liberals might be found in the "obligations" school;
and the "power elite" perspective is probably peculiar to radicals or, more precisely,
nascent revolutionaries.0 3 If my formulations have any semblance of accuracy, some
intriguing areas of research emerge. I shall mention only one. Presidential perspectives may provide useful indices of changing attitudes among the public,
especially among the political activists. For example, the differences in tone and
prescriptions between C. Wright Mills and Noam Chomsky may well reflect changes
in the revolutionary temper if the Chomsky version of the "power elite" perspective
is accepted. Even more important than changes within a category would be changes
in acceptance between categories. A decline in "obligations" and corresponding
increase in the "constraints" perspective might reflect a reduction in the more extreme
liberalism with its optimism and belief in government action (especially presidential
action) to solve social ills.
In conclusion, I suggest that we need to examine and test some of the assumptions
and assertions about the extent of presidential responsibilities, the adequacy of the
President's powers, the importance of individual Presidents' behavior, and the impact of proposed changes in the presidency, inherent in each of the six perspectives.
Perhaps because of the difficulty of achieving adequate access (in comparison to
Congress), scholars have failed to generate sufficient data about the actual workings
of the presidency. Without such empirical data, however, it is difficult to compare
or evaluate the various perspectives; and we are often confined to exposition.
61

The words liberal, extreme, etc. are used here without conscious pejorative intent.
82 Irrespective of their initial ideological inclinations, many participant-observers, chastened by their
experiences in office, probably leave the White House or Executive Office as confirmed moderates-at
least in their perspectives on the presidency.
"I have excluded the statecraft category. Although statecraft is putatively the province of political
scientists, it requires a bolder man than this writer to identify his professional brethren with any particular political positions. Besides, Machiavelli's unfortunate experiences, and Professor Neustadt's lonely
eminence in this category, suggest that a statecraft perspective may require qualities denied most political
scientists.

